We consider the use of forward contracts to reduce risk for firms operating in a spot market. Firms have private information on the distribution of prices in the spot market. We discuss different ways in which firms may agree on a bilateral forward contract: either through direct negotiation or through a broker. We introduce a form of supply-function equilibrium in which two firms each offer a supply function and the clearing price and quantity for the forward contracts are determined from the intersection. In this context a firm can use the offer of the other player to augment its own information about the future price.
Introduction
Forward contracting is a common arrangement between firms who seek to minimize the risk of price variation when trading commodities. A firm that wishes to sell a commodity that is delivered in the future might arrange a forward price with the buyer so that both have some certainty on what will be exchanged when the contract is settled. In this paper we are interested in such contracts that are negotiated over the counter by a seller and a buyer, as opposed to being traded in an exchange.
Such bilateral contracting is a common feature of many wholesale electricity markets that are characterized by occasional very high prices in the spot market caused by restrictions on the storage of electricity. It is no surprise that in such markets forward contracts are signed between retailers (purchasers in the spot market) and generators (sellers in the spot market) in order to reduce the 5 we consider the impact of a player improving its own forecast using the information implicit in the other player's offer.
Our work falls into the area of economics that relates to bargaining between parties with private information. Much has been written about this, with examples often drawn from the field of legal disputes or wage negotiations. The review by Kennan and Wilson [18] gives a summary of this work, and draws attention to the way that careful specification of the procedure used in reaching agreement is necessary to determine the equilibria that may occur. We are interested in whether such behavior occurs in the particular case where agents with private information negotiate the forward trading of commodities in view of random future prices.
In reviewing the literature, we begin by considering work that looks at forward prices in electricity markets, since that is a primary area of application. A standard approach in modeling forward contracting is to invoke an arbitrage argument so that forward prices will match actual prices in expectation. The problem then reduces to a careful consideration of the detailed stochastic behavior of spot prices, on which much has been written in the electricity market literature (see e.g. [19] ).
In practice, it has been observed that forward prices rarely match actual prices in expectation, and there is considerable discussion in this literature of the sign of the difference between forward and spot prices. This is an empirical question which is not straightforward to answer since the sign of the forward premium will depend on circumstances. An important paper in this area is Bessembinder and Lemmon [4] who analyze the premium as reflecting a supply and demand imbalance as risk averse players attempt to optimize their utilities using the contract market. Their empirical results are based on day ahead prices obtained from the PJM market. Recent work has identified similar premia in the day-ahead markets operated by the Mid-West ISO [7] , and the New England ISO [15] .
Similar interest has emerged in Europe. Bunn and Chen [8] give a helpful discussion of the various factors that influence the British market looking at both the day ahead and month ahead data and using a vector autoregressive technique for estimating spot and premiums for both peak and non-peak prices. They show that premiums are positive for peak prices and negative for non-peak.
There are significant behavioral effects where high peak premiums and high peak prices tend to induce higher premiums in the future. Related work can be found in Weron and Zator [29] , who 6 Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. OPRE-2017-01-008 look at the Nord Pool market with weekly contracts between 1 and 6 weeks ahead. More generally, in the absence of risk-neutral arbitrageurs, premia in bilateral forward contracts will depend on the risk attitudes of the agents as well as their private information. Indeed, hedging risks is a key driver for bilateral forward contract arrangements. The same argument has been made by Dong and Liu [12] who discuss a supply chain context for a non-storable commodity and use a Nash bargaining approach. They use a mean-variance utility function.
The use of Nash bargaining as a model for bilateral contract negotiation in an electricity market is found in Yu et al [31] who use a CVaR-based utility function to measure risk aversion, and Sreekumaran and Liu [27] who choose a CVaR type measure but based on cash flow. There are alternatives to Nash bargaining. For example Wu et al. [30] consider a contract quantity bid in a Cournot framework and use a mean-variance approach to allow for risk aversion. Similarly, Downward et al [13] consider a differentiated products model for fixed-price electricity contracting by retailers who use a risk measure that combines expectation and CVaR.
We have a particular interest in private information, where different players have different expectations of future prices. This is a question which is of importance in practice, particularly in wholesale electricity markets where large price spikes make the use of hedging contracts very common, but where there are differences in the forecasts of average future spot prices. In this environment traders seeking to hedge their risk exposure will at the same time attempt to profit from their private information. Sanda, Olsen and Fleten [26] discuss the hedging behavior of hydro producers in the Nord Pool region. They find that large forward positions are taken with bilateral negotiation used for a significant fraction of these contracts (while the rest are traded in an exchange): some companies are able to use superior market forecasts to make considerable profits from these derivative contracts.
A number of authors have considered the negotiation process between a buyer and seller when each have private valuations. Myerson and Satterthwaite [23] consider mechanisms where a buyer and a seller have independent valuations for an individual item, and each submit their valuations to a broker. Individuals know their own valuations and the distribution of possible valuations for the other. The broker then determines whether there is a trade and the payment to be made by Anderson and Philpott: Forward commodity trading with private information Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. OPRE-2017-01-008 7 the buyer. These authors show that in general it is not possible to find a mechanism that is ex-post efficient. McKelvey and Page [21] extend this discussion to a divisible good and concave utility functions. Thus the bargaining outcome is both a quantity and a price, and these authors give conditions under which there is no ex-post efficient mechanism with independent valuations. The efficiency here relates to the social utility -being the sum of the utilities for the two players. McAfee and Reny [20] consider similar models with a correlation between buyer and seller valuations and show that this can have significant effects on the end result. They show how an efficient outcome can become possible, provided the broker acts as a budget balancer, with payments balancing on average but not for every realization. Our problem is similar to that considered by McKelvey and Page, except that we are concerned only with financial exchanges, and utility in our framework is used to reflect risk preferences, rather than utility from a good.
The Nash bargaining solution is derived for a case where all information is common knowledge.
There have been several papers looking at Nash bargaining with incomplete information. Harsanyi and Selton [16] considered an extension of the Nash bargaining solution in which there is a fixed set of types and a distribution over the pairs of types for the two players. Myerson [22] also considers an extension of Nash bargaining looking at solutions that retain incentive compatibility. There are also papers addressing the mechanism question more directly by considering a sequence of alternating offers: see Chatterjee and Samuelson [10] and Cramton [11] . At each stage a player can accept the offer of the other player or make their own offer in response. These repeated offer games are usually formulated either with a penalty at each stage reflecting the impatience of the players who wish to reach agreement, or with a possibility that the negotiations are randomly interrupted at any stage with a small probability. The difference from our case is that the analysis of these games involves a single price offer at each stage, whereas our setting will require both price and quantity offers. We have not found a way to translate the results from these papers into our framework.
The calculation of supply-function equilibria in which players deduce information on the other player's forecast and use this to improve their own forecast parallels the discussion in Vives [28] .
He considers a case where the type of the player relates to their cost function, but structurally this is similar to our approach in which we can expect to see a correlation between types. We can think of the final price outcome as a "common value" about which both players receive signals.
The supply-function equilibria in Vives are restricted to be linear and are uniquely defined.
The paper is laid out as follows. In the next section we define a model of contracting under uncertainty, and then derive a broker mechanism with non-strategic offers for negotiating a contract.
The outcomes of this mechanism are explored under various assumptions on the problem data.
The following section then describes the Nash bargaining solution, and compares it with the broker mechanism. Section 4 introduces a model in which agents make conjectures on the beliefs of the counterparty and offer supply functions that respond to these. We conclude the paper with a general discussion in section 5. Proofs of all results are given in Appendix A.
The model
We consider a model in which there are two firms, a buyer (firm 1) and a seller (firm 2), who trade in a single divisible commodity. We will assume that the buyer and seller have strictly concave, increasing utility functions U 1 (z) and U 2 (z). Each firm views the spot price as a univariate random variable W which we assume has support in the bounded interval [a, b] . The probability distribution of W assumed by each firm depends on a univariate parameter ρ. Thus firm 1 trades assuming W has probability distribution P(ρ 1 ) and firm 2 assumes P(ρ 2 ). In most of what follows we study contract outcomes when ρ 1 and ρ 2 are fixed, and so to simplify notation we will denote probability distributions by P 1 and P 2 . In each each price outcome w, firm i earns an operating profit R i (w).
There may be different scenarios that result in the same spot price, but have different operating profits, and in this case R i (w) will be the expected operating profit given w.
The firms wish to arrange a forward contract quantity Q and contract price f . This is a purely financial contract under which the buyer (firm 1) buys this contract quantity and the seller (firm 2) sells this quantity. Under the contract terms a payment is made by the seller to the buyer of the difference between the spot price and strike price, f . Thus the total expected profit made by firm 1 in price outcome w is R 1 (w) + Q(w − f ) and the total expected profit made by firm 2 in price outcome w is R 2 (w) + Q(f − w). The expected utilities for the two firms if the contract quantity is Q and the contract price is f , are respectively
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This differs from the framework of [21] where a price is paid for a quantity of a divisible good, since
we use
If f is below the range of possible prices estimated by the buyer then Π 1 (Q, f ) increases with Q and so has no maximizer.
If f is above the range of possible prices estimated by the buyer then she would sell contracts and Π 1 (Q, f ) increases as Q → −∞ and so has no maximizer. Similarly if f is outside the range of possible prices estimated by the seller then Π 2 (Q, f ) has no maximizer. To avoid this, we impose the condition throughout the paper that f is chosen so that
, and
In what follows we will study the contracting outcomes (Q, f ) that arise from a number of different negotiation procedures. The specific form of these outcomes will also depend on the problem data, so at different points we will make various assumptions on the problem data to simplify the analysis, while maintaining the essential structure of the negotiation process. The assumptions are as follows.
is twice differentiable and strictly concave with lim z→∞ U i (z) = 0
This assumption is satisfied by many utility functions, and implies that U i (z) > 0. We shall make Assumption 1 throughout the paper.
Assumption 2. There are only two price outcomes w L and
Assumption 2 is used in nearly all the examples we consider.
The assumption of a CARA utility function enables us to prove that contract settlements are uniquely determined. Since it simplifies the analysis of contract outcomes, we will also resort to this choice of utility in the examples. Given a fixed contract price f , the buyer (firm 1) seeks an optimal contract quantity Q to buy.
This gives the following first order condition.
In the same way, we can find the first order condition for the seller determining the optimal contract quantity to sell:
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1 the first order conditions define unique supply functions Q 1 (f ) and Q 2 (f ) and the broker model with non-strategic offers has at least one solution (Q * , f * )
where
This result leaves open the possibility of non-monotonic behavior of the optimal offer curves Q i (f ) and hence more than one clearing price. However we can show that any solution obtained cannot be improved for one firm without making the other worse off.
we can demonstrate that the offer curves are monotonic and hence the clearing price and quantity is unique.
Proposition 3. Under Assumption 3 (CARA utility), the supply functions Q 1 (f ) and Q 2 (f ) are monotonic and there is a unique clearing price and quantity.
We can be more specific about the clearing contract quantity, which is influenced by changes in revenue with price outcome. We define
If P i is a continuous distribution on [a, b] and R i are differentiable then λ i defines the minimum magnitude of the slope of R i with respect to price, and µ i defines the maximum magnitude of slope of R i with respect to price. If P i is a two-point distribution on {w L , w U } then
If R 1 (w) is nonincreasing in w and R 2 (w) is nondecreasing in w and P 1 = P 2 , then we can show (see Lemma 1 in Appendix A) that the solution satisfies
We now consider a special case where λ 1 = λ 2 = µ 1 = µ 2 = λ, say, so R 1 (w) and R 2 (w) are linear with slopes of the same magnitude but opposite signs. We can see an example of this in an electricity setting, with a base load generator (seller) and a retailer (buyer). The buyer in the wholesale market buys an amount q and receives price p from retail sales (per unit of power used) and has fixed cost of operation K 1 , giving a profit when the spot price is w of
The seller also supplies an amount q and has fuel cost c and fixed cost of operation K 2 . The seller's profit from spot market operations when the spot price is w is given by
The value of λ in this case is q.
When λ 1 = λ 2 = µ 1 = µ 2 = λ and P 1 = P 2 ), (5) implies that the contract quantity Q is the same as λ. In the case where P 1 = P 2 , we can show (see Lemma 2 in Appendix A) that the contract quantity satisfies
In the electricity market context that is described by (6) and (7), λ is the amount q traded in the spot market, so Q > q if the expected future price as anticipated by the retailer is greater than the expected future price as anticipated by the generator. It is worth remarking on the fact that (5) and (8) are independent of the utility functions for the two players, so they hold true even when the retailer is more risk averse than the generator. In particular, if λ 1 = λ 2 = µ 1 = µ 2 and
then differences in risk aversion will have an impact only on the price f , and not on the quantity of contracts signed.
Example 1: Two price outcomes
To illustrate some of the above results, we consider the special case when the spot price W has two outcomes w L and w H . To simplify notation in the two-outcome case we will henceforth write
This gives an expected utility for each firm as follows.
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The first order conditions (3) and (4) yield
We will also assume that
Identifying λ with ∆/(w H − w L ), we can see that (8) implies that the quantity of the contract signed is greater than (less than)
when ρ 1 is greater than (less than) ρ 2 and is equal to Q * when ρ 1 = ρ 2 .
Let each agent i = 1, 2 have CARA utility functions with
We can then show (see Lemma 3, Appendix A) that the solution with two price outcomes w L and w H , and operating profits satisfying (11) , is
which is just the expected spot price.
These will also be the values of f and Q if both firms disclose their private information (since by definition this implies both firms then have the same belief about ρ).
To illustrate Example 1 numerically, suppose
and R 2 (w L ) = R 1 (w H ) = 1. The buyer curve corresponding to ρ 1 is
.
The seller curve corresponding to ρ 2 is
. For any ρ 1 and ρ 2 the market clears at f = (2 + κ)/(1 + κ), Q = 3 + (log σ)/α. This gives a grid of possible (Q, f ) outcomes depending on the ρ 1 , ρ 2 values of the two firms. We show this in Figure   1 where we have allowed both ρ 1 and ρ 2 to vary between 0.4 and 0.6 in increments of 0.02. This is plotted for the case α = 0.2.
Nash bargaining
The broker mechanism with non-strategic offers neglects the interaction we would expect between fully rational agents in finding a clearing price and quantity, since the non-strategic supply function is chosen in a way that would be appropriate only if the other player was using an unknown fixed price and was prepared to supply (demand) any amount of contracts at that price. From a conjectural variations perspective this would be an extreme view for a firm to hold. Knowing that a buyer will want to have a higher contract quantity if the price drops will allow the seller to achieve a better outcome by anticipating this broad behavior, even if the exact probability distribution of the buyer is unknown.
In the next section we will consider the results of strategic behavior by the agents in more detail.
Here we consider another possibility and ask what will be the result of the two firms both revealing their probability distributions. In this setting we can consider negotiation taking place directly 
where Π 1 (Q, f ) and Π 2 (Q, f ) are defined by (1) and (2). As we mentioned in the introduction we can see this as the result of alternating offers when bargaining friction (associated with the possibility of a breakdown in negotiation) reduces to zero. The assumption here is that contract levels of zero will occur if there is no agreement.
We begin by showing that there is no difference between the Nash bargaining solution and the broker solution with non-strategic offers if there is antisymmetry of both the operating profits and the price distributions for the two firms around a central price point f = a+b 2
. With these conditions, both Nash bargaining and non-strategic offer solution are guaranteed to end up at the central price f . Moreover the profit to player 1 from agreeing a contract level Q at price f is the same as the profit to player 2. So both players agree on the best contract quantity and this then emerges as the choice from both mechanisms.
Proposition 4. If U 1 = U 2 , and for every y,
, then the Nash bargaining solution matches the broker solution with nonstrategic offers.
When the spot price W has two outcomes w L and w H , the antisymmetry conditions in Proposition
, and both agents have the same utility function, then the Nash bargaining solution matches the broker solution with non-strategic offers and f = (w L +w H )/2. For example, with CARA utilities as in Example 1 in the previous section, this shows that the Nash bargaining solution for (
More generally, in the case of CARA utilities we have a striking result, showing that the contract quantities in the Nash bargaining solution exactly match the contract quantities in the broker solution with non-strategic offers. This result derives from properties of the derivatives of CARA utilities, and holds without the restriction of two price outcomes. Thus our previous observation that differences in risk aversion will not change the contract quantities for the broker solution with non-strategic offers, will also apply to the Nash-bargaining solution as long as R 1 and R 2 are linear functions with opposite slopes, and
Proposition 5. The contract quantity in the Nash bargaining solution will match the broker solution with non-strategic offers when there are CARA utilities.
In general, the contract price in the Nash bargaining solution does not quite match the broker solution away from the centre line where f = f , but the two solutions are close to each other.
Example 1 continued
To illustrate Proposition 5 we consider the case with two price outcomes w L and w H , and CARA utilities. We extend Example 1 by adding Assumption 2, which enables a simplification of notation to r and s where with non-strategic offers defined by (12) and (13) . We can also show (as we establish in Lemma 4
in Appendix A) that when α 1 = α 2 = α we have
where we write σ =
It turns out that, as well as the contract quantity Q being the same as that obtained in the broker solution with non-strategic offers, the value of f is also close to that arising from the broker solution. For example on the line where
. This gives the contract price
which is close to the value f = w H ρ + w L (1 − ρ) obtained from the broker mechanism with nonstrategic offers (when both ρ values are equal). For example, with the parameters shown in Figure   1 , the maximum difference is about 0.005.
Supply-Function Equilibrium
We now consider a broker mechanism with strategic offers. In this case we need to consider an equilibrium between policies that map private information to supply-function offers, so that each agent's policy comprises a family of supply functions. When private information becomes known, each agent's policy determines their supply function that is then offered to the broker.
We suppose that the players have a type that is determined by a single one-dimensional parameter ρ. We will be interested in the case that ρ represents a player's private information, or beliefs, about the distribution of future prices. However we could use a similar framework to deal with types of player distinguished by having different costs, or by having different levels of risk aversion.
As in the broker mechanism with non-strategic offers, and in contrast to the Nash bargaining framework, we will assume that the private information is not shared with the other player, so that each player makes a supply function offer to the broker having no knowledge of the other player's type and therefore its supply function. Using a broker means that offers do not need to be made at exactly the same time. The key property of a supply function equilibrium is that a player has no incentive to change their supply function even if they know the type (and hence the offer) of the other player. This property occurs when the clearing price-quantity pair is ex-post optimal for each of the possible offers of the other player. We may think of player 1 observing the supply-function offer from player 2 and finding the best point (Q, f ) on that curve to maximize Π 1 (Q, f ). By joining up these best points for each of the different supply functions that might be offered by player 2 into a single supply-function offer, player 1 is guaranteed the best possible result no matter what type player 2 turns out to be.
If this ideal arrangement is possible we automatically achieve incentive compatibility -the truthful bid already achieves the best possible outcome. It is not clear however that such a supply-function equilibrium will exist. In this section we will demonstrate the existence of supply-function equilibria and show how they can be calculated in the special case where there are only two price outcomes w L and w H , Assumption 2 holds, and both players use the same CARA utility function.
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Equilibrium with no information deduction
We begin with the case where the agents do not adjust their beliefs based on deductions made from the other agent's behavior. The buyer (firm 1) bids an offer curve that depends on her private information ρ 1 . We write this curve in parameterized form Q 1 (ρ 1 , t), f 1 (ρ 1 , t), where t is the parameter.
Thus the buyer will purchase a quantity of contracts Q 1 (ρ 1 , t) if the price is f 1 (ρ 1 , t) . Similarly the seller (firm 2) offers a supply curve that can be written in parameterized form as
where Q 2 (t, ρ 2 ) is the quantity of contracts that he wishes to sell at a price f 2 (t, ρ 2 ) when his private information is ρ 2 . By defining Q 2 (t, ρ 2 ) as the sell amount (rather than the buy amount) we can say that the market clears at the price and quantity where these two curves intersect.
Each player takes the other player's supply function as fixed and optimizes their own offer against this. Each player anticipates that the other player's offer will depend on the other player's own information, but does not know what this information is. Hence firm 1 (knowing ρ 1 ) is faced with a supply function in contracts being offered by firm 2 that is determined by ρ 2 . Firm 1 would ideally make an offer that picks out the best point on the supply function of firm 2. Linking these points together for different values of ρ 2 , firm 1 will then have an optimal supply function for any value of ρ 2 .
To construct a Nash equilibrium, we suppose that firm 1 knows the complete set of supplyfunction offers to be made by firm 2 depending on its private information ρ 2 . Thus firm 1 knows firm 2's supply function (Q 2 (t, ρ 2 ), f 2 (t, ρ 2 )) for each possible value of ρ 2 . We seek an optimal response to this set of supply functions.
Given a single supply-function offer by firm 2, corresponding to ρ 2 , firm 1 (with private information ρ 1 ) seeks a value t that maximizes
so that firm 1 picks the best point t on firm 2's supply function (Q 2 (t, ρ 2 ), f 2 (t, ρ 2 )), using firm 1's belief about price distribution P 1 . We write this price distribution as P 1 (ρ 1 , w) to reflect the fact that it depends on firm 1's private information ρ 1 . Suppose that the optimal value of t is denoted by t * (ρ 2 ). Player 1 thus wishes to use a supply function that passes through the point
. By considering all possible values of ρ 2 , firm 1 can construct a supply function (based on its private information ρ 1 ) that we can write as (Q 1 (ρ 1 , t ), f 1 (ρ 1 , t )). In fact if we use ρ 2 as the parameter t we have
. This process can be repeated for different values of firm 1's private information ρ 1 to produce a complete set of supply-function offers for firm 1 that is an optimal response to the set of supply-function offers by firm 2.
In the same way firm 2 can pick out its optimal supply-function offers by finding values of t (which we can write as t * (ρ 1 )) to maximize
and then constructing a supply function that passes through the points
. A Nash equilibrium then occurs if each player's complete set of supply functions is an optimal response to that of the other player.
Suppose that we wish to use this framework for a case where the univariate type for firm 1 conveyed by private information ρ 1 relates to costs, then the formulation is the same except that the ρ 1 dependence in Π 1 (t, ρ 2 ) occurs in the function R 1 (ρ 1 , w) rather than in P 1 . Similarly the ρ 2 dependence in Π 2 (ρ 1 , t) occurs in the function R 2 (ρ 2 , w).
Once a complete set of supply functions is determined for each player we can write Q(ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) and f (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) as the quantity and price at the combination ρ 1 , ρ 2 . The expected utilities of each agent under information outcomes (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) are given by
We will henceforth restrict attention to the setting of two price outcomes {w L , w H }, so the type ρ i can be interpreted as the probability that firm i assigns to a high spot price w H . We also assume
The expected utilities of each firm under outcomes (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) are then given by
The first order conditions for firm 1 are derived from taking the supply function for firm 2 as given in parameterized form by Q(t, ρ 2 ), and f (t, ρ 2 ). Firm 1 can choose the value of t (and hence the (Q, f ) pair) to optimize its own payoff, and we obtain the first order conditions:
and
Given Assumption 2 we show in Appendix A (Proposition 6) that there is a set of potential supply-function equilibria that satisfy
We call an equilibrium solution satisfying (19) an anti-symmetric equilibrium (ASE). Observe that even under Assumption 2 there may also be other equilibria in this setting that are not
We will write h(ρ) for the value Q(ρ, 1 − ρ), that is the Q value on the line f =f . As we establish in Appendix B (Proposition 7), the function h(ρ) satisfies the differential equation
for some positive constant f d , and γ = (w H − w L )/2. In general the families of supply-function equilibria are under-determined by the relationships that we have (this is reminiscent of other supply function equilibrium models). Determining the function h will be enough to determine the complete solution, since the Q values on the centre-line serve as a boundary condition to determine the rest of the (Q, f ) solution. Given that f d is a second constant to be chosen as well as one of the h(ρ) values as a starting point for the differential equation, we see that there are two degrees of freedom if we limit ourselves to antisymmetric solutions.
Observe that we will require
to avoid h being negative or infinite. However if ρ is less than
and the concavity of U implies that inequality (21) fails to hold when h(ρ) ≥ 0. Thus for a solution which includes ρ values less than ρ * we will need to allow h to be negative, corresponding to negative Q values. Negative contract quantities will be unusual in practice since they correspond to large differences in the private information held by the two firms (sufficient to make the generator buy contracts rather than sell them).
In the CARA case we get 
Equilibrium with information deduction
We now consider the supply-function model with information deduction. In evaluating Π 1 (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) firm 1 uses the probability distribution P 1 (ρ 1 , w). But the information outcome for the other player is implicitly available for firm 1 if she observes (after submitting the supply-function bid) the crossover point Q, f from which can be deduced the private information of the other player that is captured in their type. Thus we consider a function P 1 (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) that gives firm 1's deduction of the distribution of outcomes given firm 1's initial estimate for type ρ 1 , and firm 2's estimate ρ 2 .
Up to now we have assumed P 1 (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) = P 1 (ρ 1 ) so that the distribution of outcomes assumed by firm 1 remains unchanged no matter what the type of the other firm. Hence the expected utility for firm 1 is computed using the probability distribution corresponding to ρ 1 , and similarly for firm 2.
This would be appropriate if for some reason each player believes that the information being used by the other is completely unreliable.
With information deduction each possible type ρ 2 of the counterparty defines a probability distribution of the spot price that captures the private information of firm 2, and firm 1 will account for this in her calculation of expected utility. One way to specify this information deduction is to use a Bayesian approach. Under this arrangement there is a prior on the set of price distributions, each player observes some private information and on this basis makes their own assessment of the posterior on the set of distributions. These posterior distributions are dependent on the private information ρ 1 and ρ 2 . If firm 1 is aware of both pieces of private information, ρ 1 and ρ 2 , then she can deduce a new posterior on the set of distributions. This then gives rise to the final distribution P 1 (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ). Under this model firms make equal use of ρ 1 and ρ 2 and we will have
. In this framework the expected utility for firm 1, Π 1 (t, ρ 2 ), has exactly the same formulation as (17) with P 1 (ρ 1 , w) replaced with P 1 (ρ 1 , ρ 2 , w), and similarly Π 2 (ρ 1 , t) has the same formulation as (18) with P 2 (ρ 2 , w) replaced with P 2 (ρ 1 , ρ 2 , w). The process for selecting the maximizing choice of t and then constructing an optimal supply-function response is the same as before.
With information deduction, the private information of one player as revealed by their choice of supply function has an impact on the calculations carried out by the other player. However to be offered, and each player chooses a supply function that is optimal against any of the set of possible supply functions of the other, it follows that firm 1 knowing ρ 1 and pretending to be some other type ρ 1 does not cause any change to the supply function chosen by firm 2.
As for the previous case we will illustrate the supply-function model with two outcomes {w L , w H }, so the type ρ i can be interpreted as the probability that firm i assigns to a high spot price w H .
When information is considered of equal value, then it is natural to set
. For example this would be the correct outcome when the private information is derived from a sample taken from the actual distribution, and both firms use samples of the same size. The expected utilities of each firm using information deduction under outcomes (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) are now given by
and we obtain the first order conditions:
and Under Assumption 2, we show in Appendix A (Proposition 7) that if (Q(ρ 1 , ρ 2 ), f (ρ 1 , ρ 2 )) is a supply-function equilibrium with information deduction then the function h(ρ) = Q(ρ, 1−ρ) satisfies the differential equation
for some positive constant
, and all supply-function equilibria have contract quantities bounded above by
Observe by (8) that if ρ 1 > ρ 2 then Q * is less than the contract quantity Q(f ) defined for the broker case with non-strategic offers. Since Q(f ) is the optimal contract quantity atf for both buyer and seller, it must be a Pareto improvement on the equilibrium quantity with information deduction.
This shows that the outcomes in a supply-function equilibrium with information deduction need not be Pareto optimal.
Numerical examples
To gain a better understanding of the character of supply-function equilibria we will explore some numerical examples. We suppose that there is a CARA utility function, U (x) = 1 − e −αx . We take
; a low price of w L = 1 and a high price of w H = 2. In Appendix B we describe how we use (20) and (22) to construct an ASE for the no information deduction case and the information deduction case respectively.
We consider values for ρ ranging from 0.4 to 0.6. By doing this we stay above the value of ρ * = 0.354 34 that would lead to negative values of Q in the case of no information deduction. It is very much harder to construct solutions that go across the Q = 0 boundary and, because this is unlikely in practice, it makes sense to restrict our attention to the Q > 0 case. Figure 2 below shows one solution possible in the case without information deduction.
We are interested in comparing the expected utility achieved for different equilibria. Because there is symmetry in outcomes the two players both have the same expected utility. This allows a natural coordination mechanism where both players select the equilibrium giving them the best outcome. To find the expected utility we will consider the range of outcomes for different ρ 1 and ρ 2 .
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But the values for the private information represented by ρ 1 and ρ 2 would not be expected to be independent, so evaluation of the expected utility requires us to be more explicit about the context for this game. Symmetric supply-function equilibrium without information deduction for ρ = 0.4 to ρ = 0.6.
We suppose that the actual probability distribution for price w is unknown but is drawn from a prior on possible distributions. This prior is known to both players. The sequence is as follows.
First a particular probability distribution for w is selected from the prior by Nature. Then each player observes a number of samples from this distribution (this is the player's private information).
Each sample is just one price outcome and the player uses the complete set of samples to estimate a probability distribution on price. It is these probabilities that are used to determine the optimal supply function to offer. The supply function offered thus depends on the observed sample. The supply-function equilibrium reflects supply functions offered for all the different observations that are possible.
To evaluate the expected profit from a particular equilibrium we take expectations over the original prior (that is common knowledge). In the case of just two possible prices w L and w H , the prior on the distribution of w becomes a prior on the set of all possible probabilities for w H . We will use a uniform distribution as the prior. In Appendix C we give more details of the way these calculations are carried out.
Assuming that each player observes 10 samples to determine its estimated probability of w H , we can calculate that the solution shown in Figure 2 has expected utility of 0.38578, which is close to the maximum possible. Here we have varied the two parameters (f d and the maximum value for Q which is Q max = h(0.6)) in order to achieve the best outcome.
In Figure 3 we show the behavior of a supply-function equilibrium when both players make deductions about ρ from the supply function offered by the other. The method of construction is exactly analogous where we use the differential equation (41) and the appropriate forms for the definitions of S 1 and S 2 . Again we have searched for good values of f d and h(0.6). This gives an expected utility of 0.38534 which is slightly worse than without information deduction. We notice that the variation in contract quantity sizes is substantially reduced in this case. Symmetric supply-function equilibrium with information deduction for ρ = 0.4 to ρ = 0.6.
We have computed the expected payoffs of a symmetric equilibrium that maximizes expected utility in a large number of examples of this model for different choices of α, and s and r. The results of some of these experiments are reported in Table 1 below. The columns headed Π give the expected utility for each player under four assumptions, namely no contracting (Π Q=0 ), broker with non-strategic offers (Π sb ), supply-function bidding with no information deduction (Π nid ), and supply-function bidding with information deduction (Π id ). In the last two cases we also provide the values of f d and Q max that maximize the expected utility.
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It is difficult to be categorical about these results. In all cases reported the broker solution with non-strategic offers improves the players' expected utility, as one would expect. Observe that for α = 0.25 and α = 0.3, we have Π nid < Π sb , but for α = 0.5 this inequality reverses. So payoffs under supply-function bidding with no information deduction are typically worse than those for payoffs from non-strategic offers, but not always. Similarly, we typically have Π id < Π nid , but for α = 0.5, s = 1, r = 8, this inequality reverses. So payoffs under supply-function bidding with information deduction are generally worse than those without information deduction, but not always. Observe (as shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3 ) that information deduction tends to reduce supply-function equilibrium contract quantities (except for α = 0.5, s = 1, r = 8), which are typically lower than non-strategic contract quantities, so information deduction in this setting often moves us further from a more desirable outcome. Table 1 Expected utilities from different equilibria.
Discussion and conclusions
This paper has considered the problem faced by two players negotiating the terms of a forward (financial) contract when both are uncertain about the future spot price, each with their own estimate of its probability distribution. Both price and quantity need to be determined. This problem only makes sense when the players are risk averse, since otherwise the different views they hold on the expected future price leads to an infinite contract quantity. In a simple model of this situation we compare the results of direct bilateral negotiation using a Nash bargaining concept, and the use of a broker who takes supply-function offers from the two players. We show that these two methods produce similar outcomes if utilities are CARA, with an exact match of contract quantities.
Our results show that the contract quantities are related to the differences in price expectation between the two players. When firm profits are linear in prices with slopes −λ and λ, so that total profit is constant, then the contract quantity will be greater (or less) than λ if player 1 (the purchaser) has the higher expected forecast for spot price. Differences in risk aversion between the players will not affect these inequalities.
The broker mechanism can be expected to result in strategic behavior by the players, with each player anticipating the supply function offered by the other. This leads to a supply-function equilibrium in contract offers. We show how these supply function equilibria can be calculated and demonstrate that they may well give worse expected utility for both players. Thus we have a type of prisoner's dilemma, where one player acting strategically improves their own utility, but when both of them do so, there can be an overall loss of utility. Our numerical results suggest that this loss of expected utility is likely to occur unless there are high levels of risk aversion. In this context it is also possible to use the supply function offered by the other player to deduce the information they hold about the expected future spot market price. However this more sophisticated approach typically leads to smaller contract quantities and no overall improvement in expected utility.
Large contract quantities occur when the two players have very different views on the probability of a high price. It is thus inevitable that an approach which uses a combination of the two ρ estimates will reduce the difference between the final estimates and hence reduce contract sizes.
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We have constructed supply-function equilibria for examples with two price outcomes w L and w H and common CARA utility function. Our numerical technique is applied to instances with
, and yields antisymmetric equilibria. It is reasonable to suppose that players will tend towards such a solution, and attempt to coordinate on the equilibrium that gives them both the maximum expected utility. However the existence of alternative equilbria, in which one player does better than the other, will make this coordination harder to achieve.
We may consider the implications for contract negotiation behavior in practice. Sometimes sellers of contracts wish to remain anonymous, for in competitive electricity markets the contract books of electricity generation companies are held in strict secrecy. One reason is that in imperfectly competitive markets, levels of contracting affect spot market offering behavior( [1] , [3] ) and so generators are at a strategic disadvantage if their contract levels are known by competitors. In some circumstances purchasers might also prefer to buy from a generator (to incentivize lower prices in the spot market) and so a speculator might prefer to be anonymous, so that this preference does not result in lower contract prices.
However our results suggest that direct negotiation may have some advantages over dealing through a broker. This is particularly the case where players are relatively sophisticated and have a good knowledge of their counterparty's operating costs. In these cases strategic interactions when dealing through a broker should lead to a supply-function equilibrium in offer curves. But the multiplicity of potential equilibria will make it hard to coordinate on a single equilibrium solution, and where equilibria are found they often have the effect of making both players worse off.
Proposition 2. Any solution to the broker model with non-strategic offers is Pareto-optimal, i.e.
it satisfies
Proof Suppose Q > 0, and there is some f = f * for which the buyer has
By optimality of Q * we have
so the strict monotonicity of U 1 gives
which contradicts (24) and (25) . Thus f < f * . This means
The argument with Q < 0 is analogous.
Proof Differentiating both sides of (3) implicitly with respect to f gives Then we use Assumption 3 and write α = −U 1 (·)/U 1 (·) > 0 for the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, to obtain
Now the second term on the left hand side is zero from (3) and hence
The uniqueness result follows immediately from the existence of a clearing price established in Proposition 1 once monotonicity is proved.
Lemma 1. Suppose R 1 (w) is nonincreasing in w and R 2 (w) is nondecreasing in w and P 1 = P 2 .
Then the solution to the broker model with non-strategic offers solution satisfies
Proof Denote P 1 and P 2 by P. Now observe that the values of
remain unchanged if we define R i (w) for all w ∈ [a, b] by linear interpolation between points in supp(P), and set
So we assume without loss of generality that R i (w) is defined for all w ∈ [a, b].
Given f , the optimality conditions for the broker model with non-strategic offers are
Suppose Q > µ 1 . Then for all w = f ,
thus giving by strict concavity of U 1 ,
by (26) . It follows that
Now suppose Q > µ 2 . By a similar argument to the above we can show that for all w,
giving by strict concavity of U 2 , 
by (27) . Thus
contradicting (28) . It follows that Q ≤ max{µ 1 ,µ 2 }. By a similar argument Q ≥ min{λ 1 ,λ 2 } where
Proof ( =⇒ ) If Q > λ then λ = µ 1 and the proof of Lemma 1 shows
Similarly from λ = µ 2 we have
It follows from (26) that
Similarly from (27) we have f = b a wdP 2 (w).
then we have Q ≥ λ and Q = λ, so Q > λ. Similarly if E P 1 [w] < E P 2 [w] then we have Q < λ.
The broker solution with non-strategic offers with two price outcomes, w L and w H , and CARA utilities is
where κ =
Proof In this case the optimality conditions for the buyer are
Hence the optimal contract quantity for the buyer is
The seller's supply function (maximizing his expected utility) can be obtained similarly, and we get
From these alternative expressions for Q we can find the value of f at which the market clears. We
With (29) the right hand side is zero, and so
This simplifies to
Now we calculate the clearing quantity as
Proposition 4. If U 1 = U 2 , and for every y, R 1 ( f + y) = R 2 ( f − y), and
, then the Nash bargaining solution matches the non-strategic offer solution.
Proof We use the expressions (1) and (2) for Π i (Q, f ). Now assume R 1 ( f + y) = R 2 ( f − y) and
. Then setting w = f + y gives
Thus if P 1 ([a, f + y)) = P 2 (( f − y, b]) then maximizing Π 1 (Q, f ) over Q has a solution, Q, which is the same as when we maximize Π 2 (Q, f ) over Q.
Consider the first order conditions for the Nash bargaining solution to (14) . We need
Since we know that ∂ ∂Q Π i (Q, f ) = 0 when f = f and Q = Q, (32) is satisfied immediately at ( Q, f ).
From (30) we know that
From (31) we have
and so (33) is satisfied at ( Q, f ). Hence we have established the result we need.
Proof In Nash bargaining, we seek the maximum over Q and f of With CARA utilities we have
The first order conditions defining the non-strategic offer optimum (Q * , f * ) are
after cancelling term α 1 exp(α 1 Q * f * ) in the first equation and α 2 exp(−α 2 Q * f * ) in the second. We will write
Thus Y 1 (Q * ) = f * X 1 (Q * ) and Y 2 (Q * ) = f * X 2 (Q * ). We can eliminate f * and obtain
Now we turn to the first-order conditions for the Nash bargaining problem .
Hence
and so
This has a solution Q * given by the broker solution with non-strategic offers.
Lemma 4. Under Assumption 2, the solution (Q, f ) to the Nash bargaining solution with two price outcomes, w L and w H , and CARA utilities with α 1 = α 2 = α has f = w L + 1 2αQ log e −αs σ (−ρ 2 + σρ 2 + 1) (e −αr + e −αs ρ 1 − e −αr ρ 1 ) e −αr (σ + ρ 1 − σρ 1 ) (e −αs − e −αs ρ 2 + e −αr ρ 2 )
Proof The first order conditions for the Nash bargaining solution are (differentiating with respect to f ) This is a quadratic in e αQf which has a single positive root
Qαw L e −αs σ (−ρ 2 + σρ 2 + 1) (e −αr + e −αs ρ 1 − e −αr ρ 1 ) e −αr (σ + ρ 1 − σρ 1 ) (e −αs − e −αs ρ 2 + e −αr ρ 2 ) from which the contract price f can be derived in terms of Q, namely f = w L + 1 2αQ log e −αs σ (−ρ 2 + σρ 2 + 1) (e −αr + e −αs ρ 1 − e −αr ρ 1 ) e −αr (σ + ρ 1 − σρ 1 ) (e −αs − e −αs ρ 2 + e −αr ρ 2 ) . and the solution Q(ρ 1 , ρ 2 ), f (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) satisfies the symmetry conditions:
then the first order conditions for firm 2 also holds.
When U (x) = 1 − e −αx , U (x) = αe −αx and the first order conditions become (using S 1 and S 2 for the values of ∂Q/df along the ρ 1 = constant and ρ 2 = constant lines respectively):
ρ 1 exp (−αs − αQ(ρ 1 , ρ 2 )(w H − f (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ))) (S 2 (ρ 1 , ρ 2 )(w H − f (ρ 1 , ρ 2 )) − Q(ρ 1 , ρ 2 )) + (1 − ρ 1 ) exp (−αr − αQ(ρ 1 , ρ 2 )(w L − f (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ))) (S 2 (ρ 1 , ρ 2 )(w L − f (ρ 1 , ρ 2 )) − Q(ρ 1 , ρ 2 )) = 0, ρ 2 exp (−αr − αQ(ρ 1 , ρ 2 )(f (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) − w H )) (S 1 (ρ 1 , ρ 2 )(f (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) − w H ) + Q(ρ 1 , ρ 2 )) + (1 − ρ 2 ) exp (−αs − αQ(ρ 1 , ρ 2 )(f (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) − w L )) (S 1 (ρ 1 , ρ 2 )(f (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) − w L ) + Q(ρ 1 , ρ 2 )) = 0.
Thus
With information deduction the equations are the same with both ρ 1 and ρ 2 replaced with (ρ 1 + ρ 2 )/2.
Next we discuss how these equations can be used to construct a numerical solution for all pairs (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) in a given range. For the case without information deduction we begin by constructing a solution to the differential equation (40) for the Q value along the line where ρ 1 + ρ 2 = 1, (on this line we have f = (w H + w L )/2). We will use an iterative process where at each stage we suppose we know the Q and f values for all ρ 1 , ρ 2 values with ρ 1 + ρ 2 = K, then for a chosen small increment δ ρ we construct the (Q, f ) values along the line ρ 1 + ρ 2 = K + δ ρ . We do this by simply finding the crossing point when we extend the ρ 1 = constant, and ρ 2 = constant curves from the previous set of values. We already know the values (Q A , f A ) at (ρ 1, ρ 2 − δ ρ ) and the values (Q B , f B ) at (ρ 1 − δ ρ , ρ 2 ).
We writing S 1A for S 1 from (42) evaluated at (Q A , f A ) with ρ 2 taking the value ρ 2 − δ ρ , and we write S 2B for S 2 from (43) evaluated at (Q B , f B ) with ρ 1 taking the value ρ 1 − δ ρ . Then the crossing occurs when
so we can deduce
